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INTRODUCTION
Peremptory juror challenges are an everyday function of criminal
procedure.1 Attorneys may no longer use peremptory challenges to
strike a juror on gender grounds; however; leading to unfair and
unrepresentative single-gender juries.2 The creation of a single-gender
jury is procedurally criminal.
This Note will discuss gender-based peremptory challenges
throughout history and how the challenges function in practice. This
Note also will examine compositions of single-gender juries in criminal
1. See PAUL MARCUS ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED UNDER THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT: TRIALS, PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE, AND CONFRONTATION 71–72 (2012).
2. See id. at 74.
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cases, most notably in the 2013 George Zimmerman trial. Further
examination shows that a single-gender jury is not an accurate rep-
resentation of a defendant’s peers, especially in Florida, where juries
are comprised of only six jurors in a second-degree murder trial.3
Thus, there is a tension between the Supreme Court’s majority opin-
ion in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., which advocates that gender
is unrelated to partiality,4 and the constitutional all-female (or all-
male) jury, because the resulting jury is biased due to jury’s compo-
sition of the same sex.
In summary, the prohibition on gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges, while based on sound jurisprudence, do not reflect that
gender plays an important part in criminal jury trials. When single-
gender juries are permitted, society is not represented, and even
though the jury may be “impartial” on its face, the jury is not a diverse
collection of the defendant’s peers.
I. THE GENDER-BASED PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
A. In General: Peremptory Challenges
Juror selection is a key part of trial, because the jurors deter-
mine the facts of the case, evaluate the reliability of witnesses, and
decide whether a criminal defendant will be convicted or acquitted.5
Both the prosecutor and defense attorney therefore should carefully
select jurors.6 Attorneys select jurors through voir dire, the “process
by which an impartial jury is selected from a larger group of pro-
spective jurors.”7 During voir dire each attorney asks each prospec-
tive juror questions, hoping to elicit information that permits the
attorney to figure out whether the juror would help or harm his or
her case.8 If the attorney finds that the prospective juror does not
have the ability to be an adept and impartial member, then that
3. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.270.
4. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994).
5. See CRAIG HEMMENS ET AL., CRIMINAL COURTS: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE
255–56 (2010). Further, a juror views everything at trial through the lens of his or her
own biases and life experiences.
6. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 1, at 71. The prosecutor and the defense take this
approach to award their client the best chance of a successful trial.
7. Id. at 69.
8. D. SHANE READ, WINNING AT TRIAL 31–33 (2007). Common voir dire questions
delve into the subject matter of the prospective juror’s pretrial knowledge of the case,
such as knowledge of the case due to new reports, being involved in a similar event to
the charge against the defendant, general bias against law enforcement or the criminal
justice system, “anything to elicit a preconceived notion or bias.” MARCUS ET AL., supra
note 1, at 70.
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juror will be dismissed “for cause.”9 Each attorney has an unlimited
amount of juror challenges for cause.10 These challenges, however,
must be accompanied by the attorney’s explanation of the ground for
the challenge.11
In addition to just cause challenges, attorneys may make use of
peremptory challenges.12 These peremptory challenges permit both
the prosecutor and defense counsel to strike potential jurors “without
cause and without disclosure of their strategy or rationale.”13 Statutes
govern the number of peremptory challenges each side is allotted.14
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure grant each side three
peremptory challenges for a minor crime, six to ten for a crime
punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, and twenty in a
capital punishment case.15 State statutes can differ on how many chal-
lenges each side may have, but are otherwise similar to the Federal
Rules.16 Peremptory challenges are subject to two prohibitions: attor-
neys may not use a peremptory challenge solely on the basis of race,
nor may they challenge on the basis of gender.17
B. Batson: Equal Protection Protects Jurors from
Racial Discrimination
Peremptory challenges were not subject to judicial review until
the landmark 1986 Supreme Court decision Batson v. Kentucky, when
the Supreme Court examined whether peremptory challenges could
be used to strike jurors in a regular pattern of racial discrimination
through an equal protection analysis.18 Prior to Batson, the Supreme
Court first examined equal protection claims on grounds of racial
discrimination relating to a jury in 1880, and stated, “The very idea
9. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 1, at 71.
10. Id.
11. Id. Common challenges for cause have resulted from the potential juror’s
obviously biased or prejudiced responses to voir dire questions and a stated inability to
serve. Sometimes even the mere appearance and expressions of the potential juror will
elicit a challenge for cause.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 72.
15. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
16. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 1, at 72. Florida, for example, permits: ten peremptory
challenges when the criminal case involves a crime punishable by death or life imprison-
ment; six challenges for all other felonies; and three challenges for a misdemeanor. Fla.
R. Crim. P. 3.350.
17. READ, supra note 8, at 37.
18. 476 U.S. 79, 80–83 (1986). The Equal Protection Clause states, “No State shall . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
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of a jury is a body . . . composed of the peers or equals of the person
whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his
neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status
in society as that which he holds.”19 The Court expanded on this rea-
soning in Batson: “Those on the venire must be ‘indifferently chosen,’
to secure the defendant’s right under the Fourteenth Amendment
to ‘protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice.’” 20
In Batson, an African American man was on trial before an all-
white jury.21 During jury selection, the prosecutor in the case struck
all four African Americans from the venire through the use of
peremptory challenges.22 The Supreme Court held, on the basis of
the equal protection clause, that a prosecutor cannot challenge
jurors exclusively on the basis of race.23 Discriminating against the
potential juror because of his or her race not only harms the defen-
dant by denying them the right to a fair trial, but also “[t]he harm
from discriminatory jury selection extends . . . to touch the entire
community . . . [and] undermine[s] public confidence in the fairness
of our system of justice.” 24
The Court established a three-step inquiry to examine if a pros-
ecutor’s peremptory challenge was racially discriminatory: (1) “deter-
mine whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing that
the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge had been based on the pro-
spective juror’s race”; (2) if that showing was made, the burden
shifts to the prosecutor “to present a race-neutral explanation for
striking the juror”; and (3) determine “whether the defendant had
met [his or] her burden of proving purposeful discrimination.”25 In so
providing a method to combat racially discriminatory peremptory
challenges, Batson therefore solidified the idea that a specific group
or societal class could not be prevented from serving on a jury.
C. Extension of Batson Rationale, Prohibiting Discriminatory
Peremptory Challenges to Gender
The Equal Protection Clause also prohibits discrimination on
the basis of gender.26 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. extended the
19. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
20. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86–87 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 152 (1968))
(citing Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309)).
21. Id. at 83.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 90.
24. Id. at 87.
25. See id. at 96–98; MARCUS ET AL., supra note 1, at 73.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)
(citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971)).
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Supreme Court’s Equal Protection analysis in Batson to gender-based
peremptory challenges.27 Historically, the peremptory challenge
gender issue did not arise before the Supreme Court, due to the com-
plete exclusion of women from jury service.28 The Court in Strauder
had even explicitly stated that jury selection “may [be] confine[d] . . .
to males.”29 Even after the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment,
which granted women the right to vote, women in many states were
still excluded from jury service or were subjected to other barriers
aimed at preventing women from serving on juries.30 Clearly, there
has been “historical prejudice” against women, which the Court
finally unambiguously recognized: “our Nation has had a long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination.”31
J.E.B. originated from a Complaint brought by a minor child’s
mother for paternity and child support against J.E.B.32 Out of
thirty-six potential jurors (twelve male and twenty-four female),
females composed the entire jury at trial.33 The prosecutor used nine
out of ten peremptory strikes to eliminate male jurors, and the
defense attorney used nine out of ten strikes to eliminate female
jurors.34 Against J.E.B.’s objections, the trial court decided, “Batson
does not extend to gender-based peremptory challenges.” 35 The
Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed that ruling; however, the
Supreme Court reversed in a six-to-three decision.36
On appeal, the issue in J.E.B. was “whether peremptory chal-
lenges based on gender stereotypes provide substantial aid to a liti-
gant’s effort to secure a fair and impartial jury.” 37 The respondent
argued that men on a jury in this case would be more sympathetic to
the father in the paternity action, while women would be more sym-
pathetic to the mother.38 The Court rejected this argument outright,
stating that it perpetuates “the same stereotypes that justified the
wholesale exclusion of women from juries and the ballot box.” 39 The
27. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 145–46 (1994).
28. Id. at 131–33.
29. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880).
30. Such as “registration requirements and automatic exemptions.” J.E.B., 511 U.S.
at 131.
31. Id. at 128, 136.
32. Id. at 129.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 127, 129, 146.
37. Id. at 137.
38. Id. at 137–38.
39. Id. at 139. The Court continued, “gender classifications that rest on impermis-
sible stereotypes violate the Equal Protection Clause, even when some statistical support
can be conjured up for the generalization.” Id. at n.11.
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Court stressed the dangers of perpetuating gender stereotypes in the
judicial system: because when such challenges are employed through
gender stereotypes, “they ratify and reinforce prejudicial views of the
relative abilities of men and women”—indeed, such gender stereo-
types which “have wreaked injustice in so many spheres of our
country’s public life . . . .” 40
The ultimate holding eradicated peremptory challenges based on
gender, due to the need for “fair and nondiscriminatory” jury selec-
tion procedures, and protection against “historical prejudice.” 41 As a
result, gender can no longer “serve as a proxy for bias.” 42 In order to
avoid appearances of gender bias, the Court instructed that attorneys
should use the voir dire process to find actual or implied bias
amongst the venire members.43 That way, both parties will be able
to “exercise their peremptory challenges intelligently.” 44 After voir
dire, if a defendant desires to bring a gender discrimination case, he
or she “must make a prima facie showing of intentional discrimi-
nation before the party exercising the challenge is required to explain
the basis for the strike.” 45 The explanation required is not compli-
cated, as an explanation founded in a “juror characteristic other than
gender,” that is not pretextual, will suffice.46
Not all the Justices agreed with the Court’s holding, however.
Justice O’Connor thought the J.E.B. result negatively changed the
role of peremptory challenge, which is “a practice of ancient origin,”
that “helps produce fair and impartial juries.” 47 She also proposed
that a defendant’s use of peremptory challenges based on gender
should “be limited to the government’s use of gender-based peremp-
tory strikes.” 48 Others disagreed entirely with allowing peremptory
challenges at all, arguing:
[T]he Court’s legal reasoning . . . invalidates much more than
sex-based strikes. After identifying unequal treatment (by sepa-
rating individual exercises of peremptory challenge from the
process as a whole), the Court applies the “heightened scrutiny”
40. Id. at 140.
41. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 128, 146.
42. Id. at 143.
43. Id. at 143–44.
44. Id. at 144.
45. Id. at 144–45.
46. Id. at 145.
47. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 147 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 147 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted); Justice Scalia also rec-
ognized this, calling it “preposterous” for a prosecutor to not be able to strike nine out of ten
men because the defense attorney struck nine out of ten women. Id. at 159–60 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
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mode of equal protection analysis used for sex-based discrimina-
tion, and concludes that the strikes fail heightened scrutiny be-
cause they do not substantially further an important government
interest. The Court says that the only important government
interest that could be served by peremptory strikes is “securing
a fair and impartial jury.” It refuses to accept respondent’s
argument that these strikes further that interest by eliminating
a group (men) which may be partial to male defendants, because
it will not accept any argument based on “the very stereotype the
law condemns.” 49
A line of criticism has evolved in furtherance of this dissent, argu-
ing that peremptory challenges no longer serve a functional purpose.
In fact, after the J.E.B. decision, many experts predicted that the
Court could possibly eliminate peremptory challenges entirely.50 Not-
withstanding this criticism, the Court has since “increased scrutiny”
of Batson peremptory challenges.51
Others, still, argue against peremptory challenges themselves.
Some believe that peremptory challenges no longer exist in practice,
since the Court’s mandate for an explanation of each proposed strike
effectively eliminates the point of peremptory challenges as initially
imagined: allowing attorneys to remove potential jurors without stat-
ing a cause.52 Professor Erwin Chemerinsky believes that the ratio-
nale behind peremptory challenges is “that the fairest jury will result
if each side is able to exclude the jurors that it perceives to be most
biased in favor of its opponent,” and thus, peremptory challenges
49. Id. at 160–61 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
50. See, e.g., Karen L. Cipriani, Note, The Numbers Don’t Add Up: Challenging the
Premise of J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1253, 1259 (1994). Justice
Scalia, the textualist that he is, worried that the majority opinion in J.E.B. came danger-
ously close to eliminating the peremptory challenge. He viewed peremptory challenges
as an essential part of a fair jury trial, as it has been “since the dawn of the common
law.” J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 163 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51. John P. Bringewatt, Note, Snyder v. Louisiana: Continuing the Historic Trend
Towards Increased Scrutiny of Peremptory Challenges, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1283, 1299
(2010). Bringewatt proposes that the Court, through Snyder, has imposed a new, stricter
standard for judging peremptory challenges: that unless the trial judge explains his or
her decision behind a prosecutor’s proffered justification for a peremptory challenge, the
justification is rejected. Id.; see also Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 479, 485–86 (2008).
52. See Vivien Toomey Montz & Craig Lee Montz, The Peremptory Challenge: Should
it Still Exist? An Examination of Federal and Florida Law, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 451–52,
471 (2000) (declaring that the state of Florida has functionally eliminated peremptory
challenges by disallowing strikes based upon findings of pretext. Peremptory challenges
are therefore no longer a useful tool in jury selection in Florida); see also Coburn R. Beck,
Note, The Current State of the Peremptory Challenge, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 961, 961
(1998) (arguing that peremptory challenges no longer exist because they require a prof-
fered explanation for the challenge now, thereby undercutting the initial without cause
peremptory challenge at its inception).
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should be eliminated if they are not necessary to ensure a fair trial.53
Further, the respondent in J.E.B. has a point: women and men do
generally have predispositions to be more sympathetic to the defen-
dant or complainant in different cases, like in J.E.B.’s paternity case;
the Court even recognized that, while perpetuating a stereotype,
J.E.B.’s argument may contain a “shred of truth.” 54 This will be
discussed later on in this Note.55
D. Peremptory Challenges in Practice
For the most part, claims of gender discrimination in peremp-
tory challenges do not succeed because attorneys may state any
reason, other than gender, for excluding the juror. Often, this reason
will be the juror said something the attorney finds fault with, or the
attorney can point to the juror’s experiences or jobs.56 Being able to
express a gender-neutral reason for one’s peremptory challenge is
therefore crucial to surviving a J.E.B. challenge.57 During voir dire,
attorneys should ask more specific questions in order to elicit further
information from potential jurors, because applying a peremptory
challenge “will require greater consideration of the jurors’ opinions,
beliefs, and experiences.” 58 Attorneys on each side must therefore
now utilize more “sophisticated rationales” when proffering explana-
tions for peremptory challenges.59
Jury selection after J.E.B. now requires a more effective voir dire
by each of the attorneys in order to maximize the information gained
in the short time spent with each venire member. Attorneys need to:
(1) discover “information beyond basic demographics”; (2) utilize “open-
ended questions”; (3) employ personable traits that will encourage
jurors to open up and “disclose information about their experiences
and opinions”; and (4) “pursue questions in a consistent manner.”60
This intensive and lengthy process has increased the costs of liti-
gation.61 In fact, many dissenting Justices since J.E.B. have expressed
53. Erwin Chemerinsky, Gender-Based Juries?, 31 TRIAL 34, 34, 35 (1995).
54. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140 n.11.
55. See infra Part III.
56. Exercising Peremptory Challenges in Light of J.E.B., NAT’L LEGAL RESEARCH GROUP
(Aug. 24, 2014, 2:38 PM), http://www.nlrg.com/our-services/jury-research-division/jury
-research-publications/-exercising-peremptory-challenges-in-light-of-jeb/, archived at http://
perma.cc/566U-7MW5.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (noting that attorneys will need to conduct more research in advance of voir
dire and spend more time questioning the venire members); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama
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concern about the enormous amount of time and effort that will be
spent on adjudicating peremptory challenge discrimination claims.62
Justice Scalia howled that extending Batson to sex “will provide the
basis for extensive collateral litigation.” 63 Not only would criminal
defendants take advantage of this litigation, but civil litigants too,
since “every case contains a potential sex-based claim.” 64
These worries about the increased costs of litigation have largely
not come to fruition. Compared to the collateral litigation in the
aftermath of Batson, J.E.B. resulted in minuscule amounts of extra
litigation.65 Hightower’s 2000 empirical analysis of the five years after
J.E.B. shows that while Batson was cited 2,474 times in the five years
after it was decided, J.E.B. was cited just 459 times.66 Hightower
also found that 127 complaints alleging a violation of J.E.B. were
filed in those five years after the decision, resulting in only twenty-
three reversed decisions.67 Therefore, when comparing J.E.B. to the
legacy of Batson, race-based peremptory challenges, instead of
gender-based challenges, have presented a much larger undertaking
for courts.68 The Justices’ concerns about eliminating gender-based
peremptory challenges thus have been largely overblown.
II. THE “RIGHT” TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY OF ONE’S PEERS
A. “Composed of the Peers . . . .” 69
Single-gender juries are not constitutionally proscribed. The Sixth
Amendment only grants the right to an “impartial jury,” not a right
ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S., 127, 149–50 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting lengthier trials, an in-
crease in complex issues on appeal, and a “diminished . . . ability of litigants to act on . . .
gender-based assumptions . . . .”).
62. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 147 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[J]ury selection—once a
sideshow—will become part of the main event.”); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614, 645 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (the time devoted by judges and lawyers to liti-
gate peremptory challenge discrimination claims will be “enormous”); Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 102 (1986) (White, J., concurring) (the Batson holding will require “much
litigation” to “spell out [its] contours”).
63. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 162 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64. Id. Justice Scalia was also worried about lengthening the already burdensome
voir dire process.
65. Susan Hightower, Sex and the Peremptory Strike: An Empirical Analysis of J.E.B.
v. Alabama’s First Five Years, 52 STAN. L. REV. 895, 896 (2000) [hereinafter Hightower,
Sex and the Peremptory Strike].
66. Id. at 905. Hightower used the Westlaw ALLCASES database to gather her
statistics.
67. Id. at 906.
68. Id.
69. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
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to a jury of one’s “peers.” 70 Interpretation of the Sixth Amendment
since its inception, however, tells a different story.71 Historians orig-
inally believed the Sixth Amendment was rooted in the Magna
Carta, though historians no longer accept that.72 Instead, the Sixth
Amendment’s interpretation to include “peers” is attributed to the
laws of David of Scotland: “[n]o man shall be judged by his inferior
who is not his peer.” 73 Criminal defendants in England finally en-
joyed the safeguards of a jury in the Seventeenth Century, leading to
the immortalization of the jury’s composition by Blackstone in the
Eighteenth Century.74 This principle immigrated to the United States
through English common law,75 and was henceforth incorporated
into the U.S. Constitution.76
During the process of ratifying the Constitution, the idea of a jury
of one’s peers and the right to that jury trial “was so jealously guarded
that States refused to ratify the original constitution until it was
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” 77 This attitude has remained
in the minds of Americans today.78 The general belief of Americans is
70. U.S. CONST. amend VI states as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed; which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel
for his defense.
The right to trial by jury is also found in the main text of the Constitution. See U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
71. See e.g., People v. McGray, 443 N.E.2d 915, 919 (N.Y. 1982) (citing Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 543 n.19 (1975)); Matter of Welfare of J.K.B., 552 N.W.2d 732,
733 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
72. U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, Sixth Amendment: Rights of Accused in
Criminal Prosecutions 1397, 1406, 1406 n.42, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg
/GPO-CONAN-1992/pdf/GPO-CONAN-1992-10-7.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DT4D
-VML4 [hereinafter Rights of Accused].
73. Id. at 1406 n.42 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151 n.16 (1968));
FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 173 n.3 (2d ed. 1898).
74. Rights of Accused, supra note 72, at 1406 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *349–*350 (T. Cooley 4th ed. 1896) (“The
truth of every accusation . . . [must] be confirmed by . . . his equals and neighbors in-
differently chosen. . .”)).
75. Id. at 1406–07, 1407 n. 47 (citing Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349–50 (1898)).
76. Id. at 1406–07.
77. HOLLY J. MCCAMMON, THE U.S. WOMEN’S JURY MOVEMENTS AND STRATEGIC
ADOPTION: A MORE JUST VERDICT 1 (2012) (quoting Susan B. Anthony, Declaration of
Rights of the Women of the United States by the National Woman Suffrage Association
(July 4th, 1876)).
78. See Christina S. Carbone & Victoria C. Plaut, Diversity and the Civil Jury, 55
WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 851–52 (2014).
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that juries should be a collection of a group of diverse people, so that
no one factor or class will tip the scales of impartiality towards
partiality and a biased jury trial.79
The Supreme Court has also spoken on how a jury’s composi-
tion is expected to be more than just an impartial group: “[A] jury is
a body . . . composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights
it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fel-
lows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society as
that which he holds.” 80 A jury of one’s peers is important because such
a jury protects a criminal defendant from “the corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor[,] and . . . the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.” 81 A
jury’s diversity of viewpoints and status therefore provides criminal
defendants with a more just trial.
The Supreme Court continually references the rationale of a
“representative cross-section of the community” making up a jury in
support of their holdings over the last decades.82 The Court ruled in
Taylor v. Louisiana that a “representative cross-section of the com-
munity” is part of the fundamental right to a jury trial under the Sixth
Amendment.83 Further, a jury should number enough members to
allow for this “representative cross-section of the community.” 84
There is therefore a substantial quantity of support throughout
history and Supreme Court jurisprudence to support the principle
that juries ought to be comprised of the criminal defendant’s peers.
B. Single-Gender Juries Do Not Fulfill This “Peers” Requirement
Single-gender juries do not result in an impartial jury when the
defendant is a member of the opposite sex, because the jury is not
comprised of a varied group of the defendant’s peers. A “represen-
tative cross-section” reasonably encompasses all types of groups,
classes, and factors of people.85 As the Court decided in J.E.B., it was
potentially unfair to try a male with an all-female jury in a paternity
79. See id.
80. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
81. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
82. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
83. 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975) (quoting Williams, 399 U.S. at 100). In referring to the
Senate and House of Representative Committee Reports for the Federal Jury Selection
and Service Act of 1968, the Court further states that “the requirement of a jury’s being
chosen from a fair cross section of the community is fundamental to the American system
of justice.” Id. at 530.
84. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970); see also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,
474 (1953) (stating that a jury must “reflect[] a cross-section of the population”).
85. See Williams, 399 U.S. at 100.
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suit.86 To use another example, it would be wholly unfair to try a
Catholic priest in a sexual abuse suit before a jury of Muslims, or
Jewish rabbis, or atheists. It was outrageously unconstitutional to try
an African American criminal defendant before an all-white jury in
Batson.87 Likewise, it is procedurally criminal to permit criminal
defendants of one gender to be tried by a single sex jury of the opposite
gender, especially in rape cases and murder trials, due to the height-
ened severity of the crime, punishment, and the importance of juror
opinions when determining the reliability of evidence.88
There is a fine line, however, between that statement and ad-
vocating that gender has no impact on the partiality of the jury, like
the Court in J.E.B. states. It is not this author’s intention to per-
petuate the same stereotypes which the Supreme Court condemned
in J.E.B. People of different genders do view cases differently never-
theless, and this should be accounted for in criminal jury trials by
enjoining juries comprised of both sexes.
III. THE TENSION BETWEEN AN IMPARTIAL JURY AND A
SINGLE-GENDER JURY
A. The Inclusion of Women in Juries
Once the right to vote was won, the Women’s Rights movement
turned its focus to inclusion in jury duty participation as a part of
citizenship.89 In 1868, a woman named Hester Vaughan was put on
trial in Philadelphia for allegedly killing her newborn infant, and
was sentenced to death.90 Leading feminists, organized by Susan B.
Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, disputed Vaughan’s convic-
tion, arguing that she had not received a fair trial.91 They alleged that,
in addition to the jury not weighing the facts carefully at trial, the
trial was unjust because it was before a jury of all men.92 Susan B.
Anthony proclaimed in disgust: “And yet the women of this nation
have never been allowed a jury of their peers. . . . Young girls have
86. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.11 (1994).
87. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82–83 (1986).
88. Jurors of different genders demonstrate a proclivity to think and feel a certain
way as a whole about different subjects, e.g., rape; in murder trials; and when the victim
is a minor, mothers will obviously enter the jury box with an inclination towards victim
sympathy. See infra Part III.
89. MCCAMMON, supra note 77, at 1–2.
90. Id. at 1.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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been arraigned in our courts for the crime of infanticide; tried, con-
victed, hanged—victims, perchance, of judge, jurors, advocates—while
no woman’s voice could be heard in their defense.” 93 Despite this bla-
tant discrimination against women, state legislatures refused to in-
clude women in jury service, citing yet another English common law
doctrine, “propter defectum sexus, literally, the ‘defect of sex.’” 94
The argument that an all-male jury was unjust and completely
partial eventually resonated within the judicial system, and women
were ultimately included in juries.95 This same rationale, however,
also applies to male defendants. An all-female jury is equally as unjust
and partial to a man as an all-male jury is to a female defendant.96
B. Gender Matters in Juror Decision-Making
Chemerinsky has queried, “In a society where gender matters so
much, does it make sense to say that in jury selection gender shouldn’t
matter at all?” 97 He is right: gender matters. This is because both men
and women’s reasoning and perception of events contrast.98 A juror’s
gender could thereby make an impact on how the juror acts, especially
in cases concerning rape or sexual harassment, for instance.99
This sentiment has been echoed by many other legal minds. For
example, the Supreme Court has stated that because jurors do not
“leave behind all that their human experience has taught them” upon
entering the jury box, they cannot be expected to do so.100 Justice
O’Connor has recognized that “[a] plethora of studies make clear
that in rape cases, for example, female jurors are somewhat more
likely to vote to convict than male jurors.”101 Additionally, it is in-
stinctual to believe that one’s gender “and resulting life experiences”
will alter one’s view of a case.102 Similarly, Justice Rehnquist in his
dissenting opinion in J.E.B. recognized the difference of the sexes,
93. Id.
94. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 132 (1994) (citing United States v.
De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (citation omitted). Our nation’s
adherence to English common law is clearly erroneous at times.
95. Although some states dragged their feet: at least sixteen states prohibited women
from juries in 1947, and three states—Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina—refused
to grant women the right to serve on juries as late as 1961. Id. at 131 n.3.
96. For example, in a rape case with a male defendant before an all-female jury.
97. Chemerinsky, supra note 53, at 37.
98. Id. at 34.
99. Id.
100. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 642 (1980).
101. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 148–49 (1994) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
102. Chemerinsky, supra note 53 (quoting id. at 149).
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“both biologically and, to a diminishing extent, in experience. It is
not merely ‘stereotyping’ to say that these differences may produce
a difference in outlook which is brought to the jury room.”103 These
differences in the reasoning and life experiences between male and
female jurors prove that ultimately, a single-gender jury may “no
longer . . . reflect[] the diversity of the community[,]” because an en-
tire group (males, or females) has been excluded from the jury.104
Women are most commonly thought to be better jurors for the
prosecution than men.105 Each gender, however, contributes a
unique view to jury deliberations that is not interchangeable:
[I]f the shoe were on the other foot, who would claim that a jury
was truly representative of the community if all men were
intentionally and systematically excluded from the panel? The
truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a community made up
exclusively of one is different from a community composed of
both; the subtle interplay of influence one [sic] on the other is
among the imponderables. To insulate the courtroom from either
may not in a given case make an iota of difference. Yet a flavor,
a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded. The exclusion
of one may indeed make the jury less representative of the
community than would be true if an economic or racial group
were excluded.106
The Supreme Court has compared the “female perspective” to the
views of diverse racial and social groups.107 This female perspective
is significant, so much so that keeping women from juries “may at
times be highly prejudicial to the defendants.”108 One example of
this is in a second-degree murder case where the female defendant’s
self-defense claim rests entirely on the jury’s acceptance of Battered
Women Syndrome.109 One would also think that excluding men from
a jury could put the defendant at a disadvantage, for instance, in a
rape case.110
103. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 156 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
104. Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the
Jury, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1044 (Apr. 1995).
105. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 138 n.9.
106. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193–94 (1946) (emphasis added).
107. See Lucy Fowler, Gender and Jury Deliberations: The Contributions of Social
Science, 12 WM. & MARY J.WOMEN & L. 1, 5 (2005).
108. Ballard, 329 U.S. at 195.
109. See Roberta K. Flowers, Does It Cost Too Much? A ‘Difference’ Look at J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 491, 491, 491 n. 2 (1995).
110. See id. at 493, 517. Flowers proposes that the J.E.B. holding was flawed because
the Supreme Court failed to take into account the differences amongst men and women,
which manifest themselves in the deliberation process. While “women view a moral
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While the Supreme Court in J.E.B. attempted to dispel gender
considerations while selecting a jury, social scientists and biological
researchers are continually learning about the differences between
the two genders. Each piece of research and report that is published
strengthens the argument that gender considerations matter.111 There
are some researchers, however, that have found no correlation be-
tween juror gender and the jury’s verdict.112 Nonetheless, just
because the end result—the verdict—is the same, it does not mean
that gender played no part in the jury’s decision-making.
The Supreme Court flaunted its J.E.B. holding as anti-
discriminatory and a win for impartial juries.113 As Fowler points
out, however, the Court remarkably left out any analysis of how
gender-based peremptory challenges could negatively affect a defen-
dant’s right to a fair and impartial jury.114 The Court further failed
to recognize that differences in the genders of men and women do in-
deed impact decision-making, instead suggesting, “any assumption
about juror behavior, based on the fact that the two sexes are not
fungible, constitutes an invidious stereotype in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.”115 Herein lies the tension between the Court’s
view that gender has no relation to partiality, and the realities that
gender does impact jury decision-making. So far, Supreme Court
decisions have not combined these two views successfully, with the
problem in the context of all the facts,” men “are more likely to view the dilemma based
on abstract principles.” Id. at 493. Additionally, “women are inclined to view individual
decisions in light of the effect those decisions have on relationships.” Id. Flowers also
uses an excerpt from the play A Jury of Her Peers, by Susan Glaspell, to demonstrate her
point about the differences between men and women. In the play, women characters
discover evidence that was invisible to men due to a different way of looking at things.
Because the women noticed that key evidence, but the men did not, police were not able
to charge the main character with the murder of her husband. Id. at 517–18.
111. Id. at 518–20. Men and women employ different judging processes. Flowers, supra
note 109, at 518. An empirical study found that while boys grouped objects together
based on intrinsic characteristics, girls grouped objects together due to their function.
Further, “women are more attuned to . . . emotions,” allowing them to view facts within the
entire context of an event, unlike men. Id. at 519. Even biologically, there are differences
in men’s and women’s brains (albeit subtle differences). Id.
112. See SEAN G. OVERLAND, THE JUROR FACTOR: RACE AND GENDER IN AMERICA’S
CIVIL COURTS 11 (2009), available at http://lawlib.shirazu.ac.ir:8080/pdfTemp/ebooks
club[1].org__The_Juror_Factor__Race_and_Gender_in_America__039_s_Civil
_Courts__Law_and_Society___Law_and_Society__Recent_Scholarship_.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/DJS9-PY5S. Overland’s book recognizes problems with analyzing the
impact of jurors’ gender upon verdicts: (1) lack of reliable data; (2) studies used inapt
statistical methods; (3) conflating the task of decision-making; and (4) an unwillingness
to admit a relationship between a juror’s demographics and jury verdicts. Id. at 11–12.
113. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994).
114. Fowler, supra note 107, at 11.
115. Id. at 14 (citing J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 133–36).
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procedurally criminal consequence that peremptory challenges can,
and often times do, result in single-gender juries.
C. Gender Matters—Examining Different Types of Criminal Cases
The gender of each juror affects how each juror synthesizes
information and evidence, and judges the credibility of witnesses.116
Gender also impacts jury decision-making as a whole.117 Therefore,
it is important to examine how jury make-up affects jury behavior
and verdicts in the most gender-charged cases of battered women
cases, rape cases, and murder cases. Also, while not the focus of this
Note, juror gender also impacts civil jury trials, for instance: suits
for sexual harassment; employment discrimination; and wrongful
termination, and other civil cases involving civil rights, like United
States v. Windsor, the notable Supreme Court case regarding same-
sex rights in marriage and spousal benefits.118
1. Women Acting in Self-Defense and Battered Women Cases
The gender composition of juries matters when female criminal
defendants claim self-defense, and in battered women cases.119
Battered Women Syndrome describes the mindset and emotional
state of a battered woman, defined as “a woman who has experi-
enced at least two complete battering cycles as described in dating
and domestic violence.”120 Battered women are perpetual domestic vio-
lence victims who share certain common characteristics, including
fearing for one’s life and her children’s lives.121 The battered women
syndrome defense strives to demonstrate that living in perpetual
domestic violence alters women’s state of mind to the point where
homicide is justifiable.122
Between ten and fifteen percent of homicides in the United
States result from a woman killing her abuser in the act of self-
defense or defense of others, usually her children.123 Battered women
116. See supra notes 108–11 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 105, 108–11 and accompanying text.
118. See. e.g., 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013); see also OVERLAND, supra note 112, at
41–44, for an analysis of juries in civil suits.
119. Flowers, supra note 109, at 532.
120. Battered Woman Syndrome, RAINN: RAPE, ABUSE, AND INCEST NAT’L NETWORK,
https://www.rainn.org/get-information/effects-of-sexual-assault/battered-woman-syndrome,
archived at http://perma.cc/AP9U-8P4S (last visited Nov. 4, 2014).
121. Id.
122. Lenore Walker, Battered Women Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME J.
L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 321, 321 (1992) [hereinafter Walker, Self-Defense].
123. LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 202 (2d ed. 2000) [herein-
after WALKER, SYNDROME].
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cases therefore have large opportunity to be impacted by the gender
of jurors, and potentially a single-gender jury. Not all jurisdictions,
however, recognize battered women syndrome, and only some juris-
dictions permit expert testimony about battered women syndrome;
most do not permit testimony about this at all, instead titling it self-
defense.124 In many cases, even if expert testimony is permitted, stud-
ies have shown a failure of that testimony to help a battered woman
defendant.125 A large cause of this is the stereotypical view both men
and women share about self-defense cases, of “two strangers fac[ing]
off in a street or barroom brawl.”126 Juror perceptions therefore play
an integral part in judging whether the act truly was self-defense,
because juror’s subjective views alter how they view the syndrome.127
Too often, juror misconceptions result in a guilty verdict; these mis-
conceptions largely are preconceived notions relating to gender.128
Like all affirmative defenses, Battered Women defendants bear
the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, which the
Government then must essentially disprove when proving the charge
beyond a reasonable doubt.129 Thus, in battered women cases, “[t]he
female victim faced with explaining her version of the truth must
overcome many obstacles due to the constraints of a male defined
system.”130 Justice O’Connor in her J.E.B. concurring opinion spe-
cifically noted that battered women cases are gender-specific: in a
trial where you desire to pick as many jurors as possible to be on your
side, battered women should be allowed to obtain as many female
jurors as possible.131 Peremptory challenges prohibit this.132
The resulting jury may still be all-female or all-male; in that
event, gender plays a dominant role in juror decision-making. Studies
have found that juries which are the same sex as the defendant can
be more likely to be biased in favor of the defendant.133 The gender
124. Emily J. Sack, From the Right of Chastisement to the Criminalization of Domestic
Violence: A Study in Resistance to Effective Policy Reform, 32 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 31,
40 (2009). Opponents of the battered women defense view it as an “abuse excuse.” Id. at 43.
125. Id. at 44–45.
126. Id. at 46.
127. Id. at 53 nn.91–92.
128. Id. at 46; see also Walker, Self-Defense, supra note 122, at 334 (finding that
battered women are more likely to receive a fair trial when the jury listens to what the
woman and other witnesses say, and when an expert witness is permitted to testify).
129. See Sack, supra note 124, at 42, 42 n.43.
130. Flowers, supra note 109, at 532. The author continues, “J.E.B. does not protect
her rights; on the contrary it eliminates them.” Id.
131. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 151 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(using battered women syndrome as a defense may be a legitimate reason to strike jurors
due to their gender).
132. See id. at 140.
133. Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research 
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of the defendant’s attorney may also impact the verdict: another study
has discovered that male defense attorneys have a higher acquittal
rate than females.134
Particularly related to battered women cases, one study has
found that mock jurors favor a same-sex defendant when deter-
mining whether the defendant killed her spouse.135 Another study
shows that jurors determine guilt in battered women cases based on
their pre-existing beliefs about domestic violence.136
These results show that gender is an obvious component in a
jury deliberation and verdict in homicide trials where a female
defendant presents a defense centered around battered women
syndrome. A single-gender jury of women has a proclivity to side
with the defendant. A single-gender jury of men, however, may be
stacked against the defendant before the trial even begins. In either
case, a single-gender jury impermissibly permits gender to affect the
result of the trial due to the jury’s inherent gender biases.
2. Rape Cases
Gender impacts rape cases in all aspects, both when the defen-
dant is a male or a female, and when the victim is a male or a female.
Rape cases are highly contentious, often due to the parties’ genders.
In a case where gender is such a factor, it is once again possible for
the gender of the jurors, victim, and defendant to play a role in juror
decision-making, the verdict, and sentencing.137
In rape case experiments, women were more prone to find the
defendant guilty than men are.138 Women also express greater cer-
tainty in the verdict than men.139 Additionally, women are more in
favor of longer sentences for defendants convicted of rape than are
men.140 Fowler suggests that these results are because a female
juror feels more sympathy and identifies with a female victim, and
therefore judges a male defendant more severely.141 Differences in
juror gender are clear in rape cases because men and women react
differently to rape cases in defensive ways, “particularly when the
on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 673 (2001); Fowler, supra note
107, at 20.
134. Devine et al., supra note 133, at 683.
135. Fowler, supra note 107, at 20.
136. Id. at 23.
137. See discussion, supra Parts III.B–C.1.
138. Fowler, supra note 107, at 21.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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evidence is ambiguous.”142 Men bring their own biases and views to
rape cases; often, men “exculpate defendants by shifting the blame
to the victim . . . .”143
Another juror gender experiment has found that the preferences
and biases which males and females bring into the jury box may
change the verdict due to the way jurors deliberate in groups.144
While there were “significant gender differences” between the jurors
when they determined guilt independently, the same jurors delib-
erating in a group behaved differently.145 These jurors exhibited a
significant tendency to find the defendant guilty only when the jury
was comprised of mostly females, such as when ten out of twelve
jurors were female.146
It is hard to determine the true effect of gender upon jury
decision-making and verdicts in actual criminal cases due to the
confidential nature of jury deliberation.147 Social science experi-
ments discussed above, however, do identify important trends and
tendencies which male and female jurors bring into the jury box and
use to judge a defendant’s guilt.148 In a rape case, where oftentimes
the only evidence is the female victim’s word against the male
defendant’s, the composition of the jury plays an integral part in
assessing the reliability of witnesses and the defendant’s guilt.149 A
single-gender jury in a male-defendant rape case would therefore be
almost criminal to the victim, if an all-male jury, or to the defen-
dant, in an all-female jury.
3. Murder Cases
Gender likewise can impact murder cases, and surprisingly so.150
In Hightower’s five-year empirical analysis after J.E.B., she found
that J.E.B. discrimination claims to peremptory challenges were most
common in murder cases, especially in capital cases when prosecutors
struck women members, instead of the expected “gender-sensitive”
cases.151 Murder was the most prevalent type of case containing a
J.E.B. claim, sixty cases in all out of one hundred twenty-five cases.152
142. Id. at 22.
143. Id.
144. Fowler, supra note 107, at 21.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 29.
148. Id. at 20.
149. Id. at 21.
150. Fowler, supra note 107, at 22.
151. Hightower, Sex and the Peremptory Strike, supra note 65, at 895.
152. Id. at 913.
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This may be an unexpected statistic; it certainly was not pre-
dicted by the Supreme Court in J.E.B., where the Justices predicted
that rape, sexual harassment, paternity, and child custody cases
would be the ones most affected by the Court’s holding.153 However,
Hightower’s study found that prosecutors unconstitutionally struck
women from the venire in sixty-eight percent of homicide cases, and
a whopping eighty-seven percent in death penalty cases.154 These
prosecutors seemingly either felt that women are more sympathetic
towards victims, or are sympathetic towards young defendants due
to their motherly instincts.155
Juror gender does have the ability to impact murder trial ver-
dicts.156 For example, jurors split evenly down the middle on the basis
of sex in the 1994 murder trial of Erik Menendez for killing his par-
ents, with the six men voting to convict the defendant of murder, while
the six women wanted to convict the defendant of manslaughter.157At
trial, the defendant had testified that his father sexually abused both
him and his older brother, causing them to fear for their lives.158 That
the testimony and evidence at trial lead the jury to split down the
middle based on gender shows a proclivity for gender to affect not
only jury deliberations, but verdicts as well.159 Single-gender juries
therefore impact murder cases, and should be avoided.
D. Zimmerman Trial
In July 2013, the State of Florida was on trial against George
Zimmerman for the second-degree murder of Trayvon Martin.160
153. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 149 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
This is surprising because murder is not a gender-specific crime, and “death is compre-
hensible to all,” even if sexual abuse was involved. Hightower, Sex and the Peremptory
Strike, supra note 65, at 913.
154. Hightower, Sex and the Peremptory Strike, supra note 65, at 913.
155. This is a common stereotype. See id. at 913 n.112 for more information on case
specifics.
156. See Fowler, supra note 107, at 22–23.
157. Mary B.W. Tabor, The Nation; Stereotyping Men, Women and Juries by Trial and
Error, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/06/weekinreview/the
-nation-stereotyping-men-women-and-juries-by-trial-and-error.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/58C5-9Q67. “[J]urors later told reporters [the split by sexes] was not a coin-
cidence.” In Lyle Menendez’s (the elder Menendez brother) trial, the jury was also split,
though not by sex. The author suggested this result came from differences in the facts
of the case, e.g., that the abuse of the older brother stopped sooner. Id.
158. Id. Prosecutors in the case suggested that the defendant was gay, which turned
the male jurors against leniency. Id.
159. See id.
160. Trayvon Martin Shooting Fast Facts, CNN (Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.cnn.com
/2013/06/05/us/trayvon-martin-shooting-fast-facts/, archived at http://perma.cc/9A3C-5C3R.
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Florida state prosecutors filed charges against Zimmerman in April
2012 for the February 26, 2012 fatal shooting of seventeen-year-old
Martin.161 The case was in the news constantly because of the hor-
rible tragedy (which initially went unprosecuted), race issues, and due
to the gun control debate.162 The issue of a single-gender jury flew
under the radar in comparison.163
During jury selection, out of five hundred venire members, forty
made it past the initial cut: sixteen men and twenty-four women.164
The government used a peremptory challenge on four jurors, while
the defense attorney used one peremptory challenge.165 Neither of
161. Id.
162. Vivian Kuo, Fatal Shooting of Florida Teen Turned Over to State Attorney, CNN
(Mar. 15, 2012), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/14/justice/florida-teen-shooting, archived
at http://perma.cc/SXD8-95XR (regarding the racial issues); Trayvon Martin Shooting
Sparks “Hoodie” Movement, CBS NEWS, http://www.cbsnews.com/pictures/trayvon-martin
-shooting-sparks-hoodie-movement/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2014), archived at http://perma
.cc/FK7T-ZBJN (regarding the “hoodie movement”). Even the President weighed in: Matt
Williams, Obama: Trayvon Martin Death a Tragedy that Must be Fully Investigated, THE
GUARDIAN (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/23/obama-trayvon
-martin-tragedy, archived at http://perma.cc/79YY-EEEC.
163. Hardly any news outlets focused on the jurors’ gender at all; most focused on each
juror’s race. See, e.g., Kyle Hightower, No Black Jurors Chosen for George Zimmerman’s
Trial, NEW PITTSBURGH COURIER (June 21, 2013), http://newpittsburghcourieronline.com
/2013/06/21/no-black-jurors-chosen-for-george-zimmermann-s-trial/, archived at http://
perma.cc/YW7V-LWCZ [hereinafter Hightower, No Black Jurors Chosen]; Debra C. Weiss,
Six Jurors Picked for Zimmerman Trial; None Are Male and None Are Black, ABA
JOURNAL (June 21, 2013), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/six_jurors_picked_for
_zimmerman_trial_none_are_male_and_none_are_black/, archived at http://perma.cc/3Y93
-S3ZP [hereinafter Weiss, Six Jurors Picked]; Andrea Torres, African American Jurors
Absent in George Zimmerman Trial, LOCAL 10 (June 23, 2013), http://www.local10.com
/news /no-african-american-jurors-in-trial-of-trayvon-martins-killer/20653812, archived
at http://perma.cc/Q4PX-HRQP [hereinafter Torres, African American Jurors Absent].
But see Michael Smerconish, Zimmerman: Gender Not Race, HUFFINGTON POST (July 29,
2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-smerconish/zimmerman-gender-not-race_b
_3670743.html, archived at http://perma.cc/L855-R67L [hereinafter Smerconish, Gender
Not Race].
164. 40 Candidates Retained for George Zimmerman Jury Pool, WESH (June 18,
2013), http://www.wesh.com/trayvon-martin-extended-coverage/8-people-still-needed-to
-fill-george-zimmermans-potential-jury-pool/-/14266478/20608612/-/item/0/-/kr52pdz/
-/index.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/G5T2-Z9WB.
165. Jury Selected In George Zimmerman Murder Trial, CLICK ORLANDO (June 20,
2013), http://www.clickorlando.com/news/jury-seated-in-george-zimmerman-murder-trial
/20648712, archived at http://perma.cc/9Y8A-X63P. The defense struck a female African
American for not disclosing her pastor’s previous advocacy for Trayvon Martin. The state
struck an African American male because he was a gun owner who watched Fox News.
Yamiche Alcindor, Zimmerman Consultant Wanted All-Female Jury, USA TODAY (July 18,
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/07/17/zimmerman-trayvon-martin
-jury-consultant-killing-sanford/2530151/, archived at http://perma.cc/FWE9-TM4F. The
state also attempted to strike two potential jurors for a stating a difficulty in sending
someone to prison and for asking why Martin was out at night, respectively. Both of those
jurors eventually became part of the selected jury. Jury Selected In George Zimmerman
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the peremptory challenges were for gender reasons.166 At the end of
venire, the jury was comprised of six women.167 This jury was wholly
unrepresentative of the general community, as Seminole County has
just a fifty-one and a half percent majority of females.168 Legal ex-
perts noted this, stating that it was unusual for the final jury to be
composed solely of women.169
Because the jury was solely comprised of women, many believed
that the jury was predisposed to favor the government.170 An asso-
ciate professor at Widener University School of Law postured,
“[w]omen as a group might be less receptive to Zimmerman’s behavior
than men,” and sympathize more with the death of a minor.171 Con-
versely, one criminal lawyer believed that since many of the female
jurors were older, “they might identify with Mr. Zimmerman’s claim
of self-defense more.”172
Ultimately, the trial resulted in a verdict of not guilty on the
charge of second-degree murder, meaning that gender predisposition
did not affect the jury’s verdict in a negative way for the defendant.173
However, this case is still a high-profile example of a single-gender
jury, due to: (1) the lack of coverage the single-gender jury received;
(2) the way the attorneys approached voir dire; and (3) juror state-
ments after the trial’s verdict.
The gender of the jurors kept a relatively low profile in the face of
the larger racial issues.174 This is significant because it removes the
importance of the jury’s gender from the national discussion. The
country missed an important opportunity to discuss single-gender
Murder Trial, CLICK ORLANDO (June 20, 2013), http://www.clickorlando.com/news/jury
-seated-in-george-zimmerman-murder-trial/20648712, archived at http://perma.cc/9Y8A
-X63P.
166. Jury Selected In George Zimmerman Murder Trial, supra note 165.
167. Tom Winter et al., 6 Women Chosen As Jurors in George Zimmerman Trial, NBC
NEWS (Jun. 20, 2013), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/20/19060246-6-women
-chosen-as-jurors-in-george-zimmerman-trial?lite, archived at http://perma.cc/NE7Z-ELLF.
There were four alternates: two men and two women.
168. Amanda Sloane, Zimmerman Jurors All Women: Does it matter?, HLNTV (June 24,
2013), http://www.hlntv.com/article/2013/06/21/george-zimmerman-trial-female-jurors
-trayvon-martin, archived at http://perma.cc/7AB3-LGCB.
169. Cara Buckley, 6 Female Jurors Are Selected for Zimmerman Trial, N.Y. TIMES
(June 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/21/us/6-female-jurors-are-selected-for
-zimmerman-trial.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/34SG-64YG.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Trayvon Martin Shooting Fast Facts, supra note 160.
174. See, e.g., Hightower, No Black Jurors Chosen, supra note 163; Torres, African
American Jurors Absent, supra note 163. But see Smerconish, Gender Not Race, supra
note 163.
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juries because of the other high profile issues. Furthermore, single-
gender jury issues quickly became irrelevant after trial because the
verdict was in favor of the defendant.
Regarding the attorneys’ approach to voir dire, Florida law per-
mits each side to have six peremptory strikes in cases involving a
felony that could not result in a capital or life sentence.175 Florida
jurisprudence has expounded on the Supreme Court’s rulings in
Batson and J.E.B., in State v. Slappy and State v. Neil.176 Courts in
Florida have expanded protected groups of venire members, increas-
ing protection to ethnic groups and religious groups.177
An additional consideration in Florida is how the state has prac-
tical difficulties with exercising peremptory challenges.178 According
to Montz and Montz, the peremptory challenge has been functionally
eliminated in Florida.179 This is because Florida judges generally dis-
allow the peremptory challenge strike.180 In the Zimmerman case,
prosecutors attempted to strike two women, which the court over-
ruled, despite a non-gender explanation for each strike.181 Because
the court overruled the challenges, both women became part of the
jury.182 This is a perfect example of how difficult it is to proffer a
gender-neutral explanation when using a peremptory challenge.
Juror statements after the verdict also provide insight into the
impact of gender in the Zimmerman trial. After the verdict, a couple
jurors spoke out in public about their experience.183 One juror, “B-37,”
stated that half the jury initially believed Zimmerman was guilty,
and that two of the jurors wanted to convict him of manslaughter.184
One thing that potentially impacted Juror B-37’s ultimate belief in an
acquittal was how she judged the state’s witness, Rachel Jeantel,
interpreting her unsophistication as unreliability.185
175. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.350(a)(2).
176. 522 So. 2d 18, 22 (Fla. 1998); 457 So. 2d 481, 486–87 (Fla. 1984); see also Montz
& Montz, supra note 52, at 471–72.
177. Montz & Montz, supra note 52, at 473.
178. Id. at 471.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Jury Selected in George Zimmerman Murder Trial, supra note 165.
182. Id.
183. Matt Pearce, Zimmerman Juror: Half the Jury Initially Thought He Was Guilty,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 15, 2013, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/la-na-nn-zim
merman-juror-20130715-story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4DDV-ZA7U.
184. Id. Four other jurors subsequently released a statement, however, saying that
they did not support Juror B-37’s views. Eyder Perlata, 4 Zimmerman Jurors: Juror B37
Does Not Speak For Us, NPR (July 27, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way
/2013/07/17/202914162/4-zimmerman-jurors-juror-b37-does-not-speak-for-us, archived
at http://perma.cc/J8S-8WSS.
185. Anderson Cooper, Juror B37: Rachel Jeantel Wasn’t A Good Witness, CNN 
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Logically, it does not seem just that in a murder case involving a
male victim and a male defendant, not one single male was on the
jury to provide a male’s perspective. Importantly to the defendant,
it is not fair and impartial that the jury was wholly comprised of the
opposite gender. Likewise, to the state’s case, not having a male
perspective on the jury did not do justice as instructed in the “jury of
one’s peers” constitutional mandate. In this case, there were many
facts that could have been viewed differently by men; for instance,
the focus on George Zimmerman’s mixed martial arts training and
neighborhood watch habits.186 It is also easy to imagine a scenario
where, had the facts in the case been tilted further away from self-
defense, for instance, had the defendant not had a gash on the back
of his head, the all-women jury could have shifted towards a guilty
verdict.187 Here, however, like the 1994 Lyle Menendez case, other
factors in the case removed gender further from the equation.188
In Florida, a jury only has six members.189 The small amount of
jurors makes the single-gender jury even more glaring. Williams v.
Florida established that a jury of six is sufficient; however, anything
less will deprive the defendant of a jury trial.190 Still, while constitu-
tionally permissible, a jury of just six members gives a heavier weight
to the preconceptions and tendencies that a juror brings into the jury
box on account of his or her gender.
In sum, the Zimmerman trial’s six-women single-gender jury
most certainly had an impact upon the case. Because the verdict
was in favor of the defendant and the national media focused mainly
on other controversial issues like race, stand your ground laws, and
gun control, the issue of a single-gender jury flew under the radar.
It is therefore hard to tell how much the single-gender jury impacted
the verdict.
(July 16, 2013), http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/2013/07/16/juror-b37-rachel-jeantel-wasnt-a
-good-witness/, archived at http://perma.cc/EW5Z-W2U4.
186. Rachel Quigley, Medical Assistant Reveals Zimmerman Had Been Training
“Intensely” in Mixed Martial Arts After Neighbor Tells Court Trayvon Martin Was Strad-
dling and Punching Him in MMA ‘Pound and Ground’ Move, DAILY MAIL (June 28,
2013), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2350807/George-Zimmerman-trialNeighbor
-tells-court-Trayvon-Martin-straddling-George-Zimmerman-MMA-pound-ground
-position-shot.html, archived at http://perma.cc/QJT2-DN4M; James Novograd et al., The
Zimmerman Trial: Halftime Highlights, NBC NEWS (July 6, 2013), http://www.nbcnews
.com/news/us-news/zimmerman-trial-halftime-highlights-v19306124, archived at http://
perma.cc/8TEZ-F9UN.
187. Quigley, supra note 186.
188. See Tabor, supra note 157.
189. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.270. Only capital punishment cases require a twelve-
member jury.
190. 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970).
2014] PROCEDURALLY CRIMINAL 211
CONCLUSION
Single-gender juries are constitutionally permissible, and made
possible through the use of peremptory challenges. Peremptory chal-
lenges are a function of criminal procedure. However, the peremp-
tory challenge can create unfair and unrepresentative single-gender
juries, which are procedurally criminal.
Although a prosecutor or defense attorney may not use gender
on its face as a basis for a peremptory challenge, in practice, at-
torneys merely create and utilize a more sophisticated explanation
for striking the potential witness. The resulting jury may be com-
posed of a single gender. Therefore, despite the only constitutional
requirement being an “impartial jury,” an impartial jury may yet be
an unrepresentative one.
Single-gender juries are not fair to the defendant because these
juries are not an accurate representation of a defendant’s peers.
Although, the Supreme Court advocates in J.E.B. that gender has
no relation to partiality, there are many studies that show gender
does impact juror decision-making.
The differences in gender proclivities between men and women
can impact juror decision-making and the jury’s verdict, and espe-
cially so in rape cases, battered women defense cases, and murder
cases. Single-gender juries are thus not a collection of the defendant’s
peers, and are inherently unjust. Additionally, the single-gender jury
in the Zimmerman case was an optimal time for a national discussion
regarding whether single-gender juries should continue, but the
opportunity was overshadowed by the heated debates over racial
discrimination and gun control.
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